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Abstract 
Corporate Governance is needed to create a corporate culture of consciousness, transparency and openness. It enables a company 
to maximize the long term value of the company which is seen in terms of performance of the company.  In this paper, we look at 
various Corporate Governance practices followed by companies in India and South Korea. This includes parameters like Board 
Constitution, Board Structure, Different Committees, Independent Directors and their roles, Conflict of interest and Disclosure of 
information. The objective is to determine if there is a relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. The 
study tries to see whether higher and better corporate governance leads to better performance of the companies. It is found in the 
study that corporate governance practices have limited impact on both the share prices of the companies as well as on their 
financial performance 
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1. Introduction 
It is believed that the steering agent for the survival and the growth of the company is primarily its ‘Corporate 
Governance’ policies.  Corporate governance refers to the code of conduct through which companies are directed 
and controlled. Whether the company follows the stakeholder model (where all the stakeholders are considered 
equally important) or follows the shareholder model (where more importance is given to shareholders as they are the 
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owners of the company), the practice of corporate governance is increasingly becoming vital. Charreaux and 
Desbrières (2001) discuss this very crucial point of difference between stakeholder value and shareholder value. The 
increase in financial and managerial scams has led the investors to increasingly look for transparency and 
professional management in handling the company’s business. 
The concept of corporate governance has been in existence for a long time but it was formalised in UK in the 
early 1990’s.It all started with Cadbury Committee Report (1992) which was a committee formed in UK due to a 
large spate of financial scams and corporate failures in the 1980s. It was formed by the London Stock Exchange, the 
Financial Reporting Council and the accountancy professionals. The main aim of the committee was to discuss 
about financial aspects of Corporate Governance. This report was followed by Greenbury Report (1995) which was 
a study on Director’s remuneration; Hampel Report (1998) was a committee on Corporate Governance and Turnbull 
Report (1999) which talked about obligations of directors.  Till then most of the Asian countries did not have any 
legislation regarding corporate governance neither were they planning to move towards any in this area. In 1997, the 
world witnessed what came to be known as South East Asian financial crisis when all the ASEAN countries ranging 
from Thailand to South Korea faced an economic crisis which led to deceleration of economic growth in the area. 
Lot of research work has been done to find out the reasons that led to this crisis. It was thought that there was a 
relationship between corporate governance and the South-East Asian crisis. Did the crisis expose corporate 
governance problems, or did corporate governance problems trigger the onset of the crisis? This was one of the 
prime questions in front of the researchers. 
Some research works mentioned that lack of transparency and independent management were one of the 
reasons for the Asian crisis whereas some of the articles mentioned that the crisis exposed such problems and 
organisations like the IMF stressed on having good governance practices to prevent it in future. After the crisis, 
there was an emergence of the Korea SE Act and Commercial code in 1999, the Code of Corporate Governance in 
India in 1999 and similar developments on this front in other Asian countries. In India’s case also, in 1999 SEBI 
constituted a committee under Kumarmanglam Birla to recommend corporate governance measures to be followed 
by Indian companies. SEBI felt a need to regularise the disclosures by the companies in the wake of scams like MS 
Shoes etc. The committee came out with a report in 2000 but it was not implemented immediately. The 
recommendations were considered to be too strict in Indian context. But after the Enron scam in 2002, another 
committee was formed under Narayan Murthy (2003) to come up with concrete measures to implement corporate 
governance. The recommendations of these two committees took the form of Clause 49 of the listing agreement and 
finally implemented in 2006.Afsharipour (2009) states that India's reform efforts have demonstrated that while 
corporate governance rules may converge on a formal level with Anglo- American corporate governance norms, 
local characteristics tend to prevent reforms from being more than merely formal. India's inability to effectively 
implement and enforce its extensive new rules corroborates the argument that comprehensive convergence is 
limited, and that the transmission of ideas from one system to another is highly complex and difficult, requiring 
political, social and institutional changes that cannot be made easily. 
Oh Seok-Hyun (1999) in the aftermath of the effect of the South East Asian Crisis on Korean economy talks 
about the lacunae in Korea in the field of corporate governance. He shows the structural imbalances in the Korean 
economy and especially in the way chaebols are run. Kim and Woochan Kim (2008), talk about the best governance 
practices in Korea which were seen mainly in three kinds of corporations: (1) newly privatized companies; (2) large 
corporations run by professional management; and (3) banks with substantial equity ownership in the hands of 
foreign investors. The governance practices of many of these companies met the global standard. At the other end, 
of the spectrum, however, were many large chaebol-affiliated or family-run firms that refused to change and 
circumvented regulatory reform measures. Good governance helps to develop a brand name for the company and it 
improves the confidence of investors and stakeholders of the company. Existence and composition of the board 
(including the number of executive and non-executive directors namely independent directors and affiliated / 
nominee directors) , remuneration to the board members , relations with shareholders (including participation in the 
AGM) , accountability and audit , committees established to oversee critical procedures are few parameters with 
which governance can be measured. Quantitative measurement of these factors is not sufficient, the reason being 
factors such as independence of the directors or independence of the auditor must be measured from the qualitative 
aspects and not quantitative. Zahra and Pearce (1989 propose specific links among four board attributes 
(composition, characteristics, structure and process) and three critical board roles (service, strategy and control). 
Lacker, et al (2004) examines the relation between a broad set of corporate governance factors and various measures 
of organizational behaviour and managerial performance. 
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Investors rely heavily on financial statements and reports prepared and published by the company for any 
information about it. One of such reports is the annual report. Due to local legislations and requirements it has been 
observed that annual reports of most of the companies have a separate section on corporate governance. This section 
covers most of the mandatory disclosures like board functioning and its independence, shareholders rights and 
conflict of interest. Singhvi and Desai (1971) also talk about the quality of corporate financial disclosure. 
An investor looks for return in a company while investing. Increase in returns can be analyzed by the rise in 
share price. Based on the consideration that investors rely on annual reports for the financial information and other 
information about the management team to know the way the company functions which includes corporate 
governance and they are looking for returns to invest or keep their investment made in the company intact, in this 
paper the author analyses and studies whether any relation exists between corporate governance and various return 
parameters considered important by investors such as Return on Assets, Return on Equity and the movement in 
share prices . Return on asset measures company’s earnings in relation to all the funds it has at its disposal. It is 
believed better the governance model; more efficient would be the asset utilization. Return on Equity measures how 
much return is being generated by the company on the money invested by the shareholders. It is one of the most 
important parameters for the investors in the company. Maher and Andersson(1999) talk about effect of corporate 
governance followed by companies on their financial performance. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 
For the purpose of this study, two countries in Asia were chosen, namely, India and South Korea. The countries 
were chosen on the basis that these two countries are among the top four countries in Asia on the basis of GDP in 
2012. From both  these countries five multinational companies were chosen. The criteria for choosing the companies 
was that they should have an international presence, are well known brands and are among the top companies in 
their own country on the basis of turnover. Also care was taken to choose companies belonging to different 
industries and there was a mix of manufacturing and service companies. All the ten companies chosen are listed 
companies in their own countries on major stock exchanges and in some instances on other countries’ stock 
exchanges as well. Data was collected from the websites of the companies, published reports and annual reports of 
the companies. All the data collected was secondary in nature. The time period of the study was eight years from FY 
2005-06 to FY 2012-13.The share prices of each company was taken for the time period Jan 1 2006 to March 31 
2013. All this data was collected from various websites. Return on Assets is calculated as Net Income / Total Assets. 
It is expressed as percentage. Similarly, Return on Equity is calculated as Net Income / Shareholder’s Equity. It is 
also expressed in percentage terms. 
Parameters specific to Corporate Governance were considered and data was collected about them for all the ten 
companies for the period FY 2005-06 to FY 2012-13. Following were the parameters chosen: 
x Board Structure – This parameter talks about total number of directors, number of executive, non-executive 
and independent directors. This shows the independence of the board in its functioning. 
x Committees and details – This parameter talks about the number of committees related to corporate 
governance that each company has and the constitution of these committees. This shows the commitment 
of companies towards fulfilling corporate governance norms. 
x Disclosure of Information – This parameter talks about how open the company is regarding disclosures 
such as board compensation, related party transactions, implementation of corporate governance principles, 
linking of senior management’s remuneration with profits of the company and an internationally recognised 
independent auditor. 
The authors tried to see if there is any relation between good governance practices of a company and its 
financial performance. If a company is open for scrutiny and is willing to share all information with the 
shareholders, its stock price is expected to do better as compare to a company which does not disclose all 
information. Similarly, financial performance of the company is also expected to be better if better governance 
practices are followed by the company.   Corporate Governance practices though are only one of the factors 
affecting the share prices.  
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3. Analysis 
 
3.1. Corporate Governance in India 
 
Corporate governance in India is restricted to Clause 49 of the listing agreement. The Corporate governance 
norms are very strict and disclosures are mandatory. These norms are only applicable to public limited companies in 
India which are listed. Table 1 gives the corporate governance disclosures in the five companies selected from India. 
These five companies were chosen as they have international presence, a recognisable brand name and are from 
diverse industries including both manufacturing and services sector. As all five of these are listed companies in 
India, they have to strictly follow the guidelines given by SEBI (Securities and Exchange board of India) regarding 
corporate governance. Out of these five companies, Infosys is the world leader in disclosure. It has won numerous 
awards for being one of the most transparent company and going beyond mandatory disclosures. Infosys has set the 
trend in India for voluntary disclosure of a lot of items. The norms do not define how many committees should be 
there. Each company has set up the corporate governance committees according to its own needs and requirements. 
All the Indian companies have internationally recognized external auditors.  
In case of Indian companies, Infosys has always enjoyed high market capitalization as it has one of the best 
corporate governance models in the world. It shares information both mandatory by law as well as non-mandatory in 
its published reports. As a result the share price of Infosys has always performed well. Although in case of Tata 
Motors and Larsen & Toubro, there are very less or no independent directors on board, it has not affected their share 
prices much. But in case of Bharti Airtel and Videocon, on paper they seem to be following all the governance 
norms set by the government but in reality looking at their eight year history of corporate governance, it seems like a 
bit of whitewash. The same is also true for their share prices which have been languishing for the same time period. 
 
Table 1: Corporate Governance Report of Indian Companies 
    Bharti Infosys L & T Tata Motors Videocon 
Area of 
Business   
Telecom 
Services Software  
Manufacturing and 
Engineering Automobile 
Electronic 
Appliances 
Exchanges 
Listed   
India India/US India India/US India 
Board 
Structure 
Executive 
Directors 2 6 8 2 2 
  
Non- Executive 
Directors 8 Nil 9 4 Nil 
  
Independent 
Directors 8 9 Nil 6 8 
Different 
Committees Audit Committee Yes (3I) 
Yes (4I)  
Yes (3NE) Yes (3I) Yes (3I) 
  
Remuneration 
Committee 
Yes (2NE & 
4I) Yes (4I) No Yes (2 NE & 2I) Yes (3I) 
  
Investor Grievance 
Committee 
Yes (1E & 
3NE) Yes (3I) Yes (2E & 1NE) 
Yes (1E,1NE & 
1I) Yes (3I) 
  
Nomination 
Committee No Yes (3I) Yes (1E & 3NE) 
Yes (1E, 1NE & 
2I) No 
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  Others ESOP 
Risk 
Management Nil Ethics Finance 
Disclosure 
Board 
Compensation Disclosed Disclosed  Disclosed  Disclosed  Disclosed  
  
Related Party 
Transaction Disclosed Disclosed  Disclosed  Disclosed  Disclosed  
  CG Report Full Full Full Full Full 
  External Auditor Batliboi   BSR Sharp &Tannan  Delloite  
Khandelwal, 
Jain & Co.  
 E – Executive Director, NE- Non-Executive Director and I- Independent Director 
Indian Companies (Average Monthly price) 
 
Figure 1: Share Prices of the chosen Indian companies 
 
Table 2: Average Financial Performance for Indian companies 
 
 Bharti Infosys L & T Tata Motors Videocon 
Return on Assets 3.64% 23.29% 5.55% 2.29% 1.18% 
Return on Equity 5.14% 27.70% 16.53% 6.32% 0.65% 
 
The above table talks about the financial performance of Indian companies. Infosys has consistently performed 
well financially followed by Larsen & Toubro, Bharti Airtel, Tata Motors and Videocon. It seems that both in case 
of Infosys and Videocon, the financial performance is related to the governance practices followed. The better the 
governance practices better is the financial performance. The only exception in this case is seen in case of Bharti 
Airtel where the governance practices over the last eight  years are  good on paper but the financial analysis tells a 
different story. 
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3.2. Corporate Governance in South Korea 
 
The chaebols experience in South Korea has affected the way corporate governance is looked at in that country. 
Chaebols are large conglomerate businesses which are many times run by families. Many top companies in South 
Korea on the basis of turnover are chaebols which are family run businesses. These chaebols are not known for 
following the disclosure norms of corporate governance. The corporate governance norms have been made 
mandatory in Korea mainly in the last three years. Out of the five companies chosen here, many of them have started 
disclosing data only in the last three years. Some companies like Kia Motors and LG Electronics are only partially 
disclosing information about following of corporate governance norms. On the other hand, company like POSCO 
has been consistently disclosing information as much as possible with its shareholders. POSCO has won several 
awards for its corporate governance practices both at home and abroad. Hyundai and Samsung are examples of what 
are known as chaebols. Their disclosure norms have been sporadic in nature. But Samsung as compared to others is 
showing an improvement in its governance practices as well as disclosures over the last two years. 
There seems to be some impact of corporate governance practices on the share prices of the companies in case of 
South Korea. Samsung share prices have seen an uptrend from the time its governance and disclosure practices have 
become more open. POSCO share prices have remained more or less constant over the five year period studies. 
Whereas prices of the other three companies, LG, KIA and Hyundai have languished. One of the reasons for the 
languishing share prices may be due to non-compliance of corporate governance practices and general mistrust 
about the companies as there is almost no disclosure of information. 
 
Table 3: Corporate Governance Report of South Korean Companies 
    
Hyundai 
Motors Kia Motors 
LG 
Electronics POSCO Samsung 
Area of 
Business   Automobiles Automobiles 
Electronic 
appliances Steel Products 
Electronic 
appliances 
Exchanges 
Listed   
Korea Korea Korea Korea/UK/US Korea/ UK 
Board 
Structure 
Executive 
Directors 4 4 3 5 3 
  
Non- Executive 
Directors Nil Nil 4 Nil Nil 
  
Independent 
Directors 5 5 Nil 8 8 
Different 
Committees Audit Committee Yes (5I) 
Information not 
available 
Yes (3NE) Yes Yes (3I) 
  
Outside Director 
Committee Yes (2NE & 2I) 
Yes (1E & 
1NE) Yes  Yes (2E & 3I) 
  
Management 
Committee No 
Yes (2E & 
1NE) Yes  Yes (3E) 
  Ethics Committee Yes (5I) No Yes No 
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Disclosure 
Board 
Compensation  Disclosed Not Disclosed Not Disclosed Not Disclosed Not Disclosed 
  
Related Party 
Transaction  Disclosed 
Partial 
Disclosure Not Disclosed  Disclosed 
Partial 
Disclosure 
  CG Report Partial 
Not much 
disclosure Partial Full disclosure Partial 
  External Auditor Deloitte KPMG 
PriceWater 
House Cooper KPMG 
PriceWater 
House Cooper 
 E – Executive Director, NE- Non-Executive Director and I- Independent Director 
South Korean Companies ( Average Monthly Market Price) 
 
Figure 2: Share Prices of the chosen South Korean companies 
 
Table 4: Average Financial Performance for South Korean companies 
 
 Hyundai 
Motors Kia Motors LG Electronics POSCO Samsung 
Return on 
Assets 
9.58% 7.03% 0.35% 2.90% 11.18% 
Return on 
Equity 
7.62% 25.46% 2.39% 5.74% 22.15% 
 
The financial performances of the companies do not seem to be much affected by the governance practices 
followed. POSCO is the prime example of this. It has had one of the best Corporate Governance practices in South 
Korea but the financial performance as well as the share price does not reflect it.On the other hand KIA Motors also 
shows good financials but leaves a lot to be desired in governance practices.  
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4. Conclusion 
 
Asian countries share similar cultural traits but do not share corporate governance practices. In the study, it was 
found that India follows more stringent corporate governance practices based on US model as compared to South 
Korea which follow stakeholder form of corporate governance.  The difference in mandatory disclosures and 
governance practices is huge among the two countries. South Korea initially did not believe in outsiders interfering 
in company’s business and does not have mandatory requirements of independent directors and various committees 
to look after the company’s works. But slowly changes are coming about. It has put into place various legislations 
regarding corporate governance practices and disclosure norms but is not able to fully implement it due to the power 
concentration in the hands of family run businesses, chaebols. It is seen in the study corporate governance practices 
do have an impact on the share prices of the companies. But it is a very limited impact and should not be seen in 
isolation of other factors affecting the share price and the financial performance. 
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